This paper analyses the effect of bank relationships on the interest rate and personal and real guarantees borne by a sample of small and medium-sized enterprises in their indebtedness. The results of this paper indicate that the SMEs that work with fewer financial intermediaries obtain debt at a lower cost. This reflects that the advantages linked to debt concentration are greater than the disadvantages. Additionally, financial institutions show a clear tendency towards raising the use of personal guarantees as the relationship progresses and the these become better known. Likewise, the companies that go into debt with banks instead of with savings banks bear higher interest rates and real guarantees. Finally, the companies that have a more intense relationship of trust with their lender obtain loans at a lower cost, but supplying more real guarantees.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, literature on financial intermediation has gone from debating the advantages of financial institutions in highly informative asymmetry contexts (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 1984 Diamond, , 1991 Ramakrishnan & Thakor, 1984 , Fama, 1985 Boyd & Prescott, 1986 and Bhattacharya & to studying the consequences of firms and financial intermediaries going beyond a simple and anonymous economic transaction and establishing relationships. According to Boot (2000) , bank relationships entail the supply of financial services by a bank, which invests in obtaining specific information on the firm and evaluates the chances of success of the investment through multiple interactions with the same client over a period of time and/or several products.
The advantages and disadvantages of bank relationships have been widely studied.
Thus, among the former, the higher degree of flexibility in negotiation (Boot, Greenbaum & Thakor, 1993; Boot & Thakor, 1994 and Von Thadden, 1995) , the increase in the control effected by the financial institution (Rajan, 1992) , the development of a reputation (Fama, 1985 and Diamond, 1991) , the preservation of a certain confidentiality (Campbell, 1979 and Yosha, 1995) and a greater inclination to transmit private information (Bhattacharya & Chisea, 1995) must be highlighted. As for disadvantages, bank relationships produce an asymmetric evolution of the information between the internal bank 1 and the rest of financial intermediaries outside the relationship (Kane & Malkiel, 1965) , that results in an informational monopoly ("hold-up") of the former. In these circumstances, the financial institution obtains monopoly income (Sharpe, 1990) , the effort the borrower invests in management is reduced (Dewatripont & Maskin, 1995 and Bolton & Scharfstein, 1996) , the negotiation power of the lender increases (Blackwell & Santomero, 1982 and Rajan, 1992) and it becomes more costly for the firm to change the bank it work with (Greenbaum, Kanatas & Venezia, 1989 and Detragiache, Garella &Guiso, 2000) .
These advantages and disadvantages are reflected in the total amount and conditions of the loans firms are financed with. In this sense, the objective of this paper is to obtain empirical evidence of the net effect of bank relationships on debt terms (interest rate, personal guarantees and real guarantees) of a sample of Spanish SMEs. To this end, the strength of the relationship have been measured through the time the firm and the bank have been working together (duration), the number of financial institutions the firm borrows from (concentration), the amount of financial services contracted by the firm (scope), the confidence the intermediary has in the firm's management and the type of borrower.
The sample of small and medium-sized enterprises used adjusts itself perfectly to the aim of this study, as these are susceptible of suffering severe problems of asymmetric information own to their reduced size and background and the absence of "rating".
Furthermore, the studies on bank relationships available up to now in Spain (Berges & Sánchez del Villar, 1991; Saá, 1991; Hernando & Vallés, 1992; Giner & Salas, 1997; Ochoa, 1998; Sanchis, Puig & Soriano, 1998; Zoido, 1998 and García-Marco & Ocaña, 1999 ) have focused only on large firms, using the share participation of the financial institution in the firm and/or whether the company belongs to a banking group as measures of the relationship's strength.
As for international literature, Angelini, Di Salvo & Ferri (1998) 
detected that
Italian companies with longer and more concentrated relationships pay higher interest rates;
however, the scope of the relationship has a positive influence. In Germany, Harhoff & Körting (1998) found that mutual trust between the SMEs' managers and the financial institutions causes a reduction in debt cost. On the other hand, the duration and concentration of the relationship affect collateral requirements, these being lower for companies with longer and more concentrated relationships. With data on loans supplied by one of the largest Belgian banks, Degryse & Van Cayseele (2000) verified an increase (reduction) in the interest rate (guarantees) among small borrowers with longer relationships, while those that contract the majority of their services from the same intermediary bear a lower (higher) cost (guarantee) on their debts.
In contrast with the ambiguous European evidence, the results available in United
States clearly support the beneficial effect of bank relationships. Thus, Petersen & Rajan (1994) verified a reduction of the cost among those small and medium-sized enterprises in the US that work with fewer institutions, although they didn't find a significant link between the duration of the relationship and the price of debt. Working on the same sample, Berger & Udell (1995) found that the companies with longer relationships with their bank pay lower interest rates and bear less collateral requirements. And finally, Bodenhorn The results of this paper indicate that the SMEs that work with fewer financial intermediaries obtain debt at a lower cost. This reflects that the advantages linked to debt concentration are greater than the disadvantages. Additionally, financial institutions show a clear tendency towards raising the use of personal guarantees as the relationship progresses and the guarantees become better known. Likewise, the companies that go into debt with banks instead of with savings banks bear higher interest rates and real guarantees. Finally, the companies that have a more intense relationship of trust with their lender obtain loans at a lower cost, but supplying more real guarantees. Regarding the public information the firm offers through its size and age, the larger and older companies receive loans at a lower cost and are less likely to pledge real guarantees. These results show the different role of public information with respect to private information.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the sample of small and middle-sized enterprises used, as well as the variables included in the estimates. In the third section we analyse the impact of bank relationships on the risk premium and the probability of pledging guarantees. The fourth section carry out a deeper analysis of the previous results through two extensions. On the one hand, the sample has been divided into two groups depending on the duration of the relationship and, on the other hand, certain assumptions are made about the way the risk premium and the guarantees are related. Lastly, the main conclusions are discussed in the fifth section.
DATA AND METHODOLGY
The data used in the study stem from two sources. On the one hand, the results statement, the situation balance and qualitative information referring to the companies 3 in 1999 have been obtained from the SABE database, carried out by Informa S.A. from the annual accounts deposited by the companies in the Mercantile Register of the Murcia Region. On the other hand, the mean cost of the bank financing, the number of years the firm has been working with the financial institution, the use of guarantees and the degree of trust the financial intermediaries have in the firm's managers have been obtained from the survey carried out by the SME Economic Observatory of the Murcia Region 4 .
Some cases with mistaken data and atypical values have been eliminated from the original sample. In short, total assets and liabilities have to coincide, the figure of benefit that appears in the balance must be equal to the one of the results statement and, finally, the leverage ratio must be smaller or equal to one. With regard to the atypical values, the cases that exceed by one typical deviation the sample average of the dependent variable have been omitted. In this way, the definitive sample is made up of 153 non-financial SMEs. Table I shows the evolution of different magnitudes depending on the age and size of the companies. It must be emphasized that the risk premium and the personal guarantees borne by the borrowers decrease with their size and age, while the real guarantees pledged for the loans is lower among the larger SMEs. These results show that the better-known firms, either due to their size or background, receive better conditions for their indebtedness. Additionally, it must be highlighted the lower degree of leverage for the oldest companies. This fact emphasizes the opening towards alternative means of financing as the firm gains in reputation.
With reference to the variables Duration and Concentration in table I, both show significant increases in their values for larger and older SMEs. It is logical that the higher complexity deriving from their size lead these companies to distribute their operations among several intermediaries. At the same time, since the establishment of relationships requires some time, it is logical that older companies have a higher number of these. As for the variable Duration, the larger lenders are usually the more attractive ones for the financial intermediaries, so these extend their relationship over a greater number of years.
Moreover, only the older companies have had time to build up a longer background in their relationships with the financial institutions. To analyse the determinants of the debt terms (interest rate and personal and real guarantees) obtained by the SMEs in this sample, the following model has been set out:
where Xij stands for the j explicative factors 5 considered for each firm i, Dsectorialik for the k fictitious variables that measure the fact of belonging to each of the different sectors considered and £ i represents the random error. As for the dependant variables, the Risk Premium of the firm i is used when the debt cost is analysed through a OLS model, whereas to study the request of real and personal guarantees the dummies Real Guarantees and Personal Guarantees are used in logit specifications.
In a similar way to the prior work of Berger & Udell (1995) and Elsas & Krahnen (1998) , the risk premium has been defined as the difference between the firm's average cost of the bank financing and the monthly average of the 3-month interbank interest rate 6 .
The two binary variables, personal guarantees and real guarantees, have been obtained from two scales (Personal and Real, respectively) . These take values between one and five depending on whether the firm receives loans based on real guarantees (Real) or personal guarantees (Personal) with a lower (one) or higher (five) frequency. More precisely, these dummy variables are equal to one in those cases where the value of the scale is higher than its median and zero in the opposite case.
In order to study the effect of bank relationships on the interest rate and the guarantees established in the indebtedness contract, the majority of empirical works characterises the strength of the relationship between the firm and the intermediary by a series of magnitudes: duration, scope and concentration. Duration is measured by the number of years the client and the financial institution have been working together (Duration). According to , as the relationship progresses, the bank has the chance to observe, learn and use private information on their clients, has more flexibility to extend, administer and execute contracts and can build up a reputation for supplying quality services.
The strength of the relationship between the financial intermediary and the firm can also be approached by its scope. According to Ongena & Smith (1998) , scope is defined in terms of the range of services offered by the bank and used by the firm. In addition to loans, the banking relation may include the sale of other complementary services, such as deposits, credit cards, chequebooks, direct debiting of expenses, investment services on capital markets, etc. With the sale of these services, the lender improves his knowledge about the characteristics of the firm and shares out the cost of producing information over several products. In this sense, scope can be approximated by a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm works with one financial institution and zero in the opposite case (Scope), so that the relationship of the borrower that only maintains one relationship is stronger, as he contracts all his financial services from the same intermediary. 6 Obtained from the Synthesis of Economic Indicators published by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Treasury: http://www.mineco.es/sgpc/TEXTOS/pdf/completos/total.pdf Thirdly, the variable Concentration has been used, approached through the number of lenders the firm borrows from. This way of measuring the strength of the relationship is closely related to the two prior ones. Thus, found shorter relationships when firms work with several financial intermediaries. As for scope, the companies that work with few financial institutions do not only concentrate the loans but also the rest of financial services. Therefore, the more concentrated relationships are also the ones with greater scope.
As a whole, the duration, scope and concentration of the bank relationships measure the continuous accumulation of soft information through multiple contacts with the firm, its owners and its community in a variety of dimensions. Thus, it would be expected that the firms with closer relationships, that is, longer, more concentrated or of greater scope, obtain financing at a lower cost and supplying less guarantees. This is so whenever the advantages deriving from the relationship are greater than the disadvantages.
According to Berger & Udell (2002) , soft information refers to the character, credibility and reputation of the firm's managers, and has an influence on the trust the financial intermediary may place on these. In this sense, the variable Trust has been defined as a scale that shows the higher (five) or lower (one) trust placed by the financial institution on the firm's managers. Hence, a negative sign indicates an improvement in the debt conditions when the trust is higher.
Likewise, Jayaratne & Wolken (1999) and Berger & Udell (2002) highlighted the competitive advantages of certain financial institutions when processing the soft information they gather throughout their relationship with the SMEs, without which these
would not obtain financing on many occasions. These intermediaries should pass on the cost savings in the form of better terms for their loans. To measure the difference in behaviour between the two main types of financial institutions that operate in Spain (Banks and Savings Banks), the fictitious variable Banks has been defined, which takes value one when the firm only has relationships with banks and zero in the opposite case.
Together with the private information the financial institution obtains along the relationship, the firm supplies a certain type of public information. According to some authors such as Berger & Udell (1995) , Harhoff & Körting (1998) and Degryse & Van Cayseele (2000) , the age of the firm reflects the reputation that is openly transmitted to the market, and plays a different role to that of the information the financial intermediary acquires privately along his relationship with the firm. In this sense, the variable Age has been defined as the number of years since the firm was set up. Together with age, the natural logarithm of the net turnover has been used to approach the size of the firm (Size).
9 Lastly, the variables Coverage and Leverage have been used to control the firm's financial risk, as this may affect the terms established in the loan contract. The first, calculated as the profit before interest and tax among financial expenses, reflects the uncertainty linked to the fulfilment of the debt obligations. Therefore, a negative sign is expected in the relation of this variable with the risk premium and the guarantees. On the contrary, the relation of these elements with the degree of leverage, measured as the ratio of external resources to total assets, must be positive. The reason for this sign is the greater risk of bankruptcy in companies more indebted.
RESULTS
After describing the sample and the methodology, and having described the variables included in the estimates, this section presents the results. In first place, the influence of bank relationships on the banking debt cost and the probability of it being guaranteed is analysed. Following, some variables are redefined in an alternative way and the models are estimated again to endow the results with a higher degree of robustness.
3.1.-Determinants of the risk premium
This first section concentrates on the study of the debt cost determinants. Thus, equation (1) in table IV highlights the significant and positive sign of the variable
Concentration. This means that the companies that work with fewer financial intermediaries bear a lower differential on the interbank interest rate. This result reveals that the gain of flexibility in negotiation, the increase of control and the preservation of relevant information that are produced when a firm reduce the number of bank relationships are higher than the increase of the disadvantages.
Regarding the variables Age and Size, their negative sign highlights the fact that the information the firm transmits to the market reduces the informative asymmetry and has a positive influence on the cost of the banking debt, so that older and larger companies are subjected to lower interest rates. The estimate of equation (1) has been carried out by OLS, while the logit regressions (2) and (3) have been calculated by maximum verisimilitude. In the first case, the dependant variable is Risk Premium. The dependant variables in equations (2) and (3) In order to evaluate the economic magnitude of the estimates, a firm with average values for all the explicative variables is considered, and the evolution of the risk premium before different levels of concentration of the indebtedness and age of the firm are studied.
Thus, it is observed that the SMEs that work, for example, with seven financial intermediaries bear a risk premium 0.5433% higher than those that borrow from two financial institutions (1.0033% in comparison to 1.5466%). However, when the age of the firm goes, for example, from one to eleven years, a drop in the differential on the interbank interest rate of 0.2919% (from 1.4751% to1.1832%) is obtained.
The economic relevance of the variations in the risk premium depends on its sample distribution (Bergel & Udell, 1995) . Thus, the calculation of percentiles (25, 50, 75) of the dependant variable allows for the classification of the sample in different categories according to the differential on the interbank interest (with an interval of 50 basic points between each category: 0.62%, 1.12%, 1.62%). Therefore, the reduction of 0.5433% in the cost of the debt due to concentration lowers the firm risk by more than one level. On the other hand, a reduction of 0.2919% in the price of the loan due to the influence of age moves the firm almost a whole category.
3.2.-Determinants of the request for guarantees
After analysing the debt cost, the determinants of the request for personal and real guarantees are studied. So, the estimates of the specifications to such end are found in equations (2) and (3) in table IV. Starting by the private information variables group, it is observed that the Duration presents a positive sign in regression (2) and negative one in equation (3). Hence, every additional year of relationships between the firm and the financial intermediary reduce the likelihood of pledging real guarantees but increases the use of personal ones. Nevertheless, the effect on the former is not significantly different from zero.
Although the influence of the duration of the relationship on the use of real guarantees follows along the lines found in several papers (Harhoff & Körting, 1998; Udell, 1995 and Van Cayseele, 2000) , the behaviour of the personal guarantees contradicts the empirical evidence presented by Bodenhorn (2002) . A possible explanation for this result is that the financial institution improves its knowledge of the firm during the relationship. So, on increasing its information about the guarantees available, the financial intermediary reduces the cost of including them in the debt contracts and makes a more efficient use of it.
guarantees may be found in the nature of the SMEs themselves. A usual tendency in business practice is to draw dividends, concealed as assets, which are put into the owner's name. In this way, the capacity of the borrower to guarantee the loans with the firm's assets is reduced. Consequently, financial institutions increase the use of personal guarantees as the relationship gets closer and have more information about the firm and its owners.
Whatever the reason is for rise in the use of personal guarantees as the relationship between firm and intermediary progresses, what does appear to be clear is that it is possible due to the informational monopoly carried out by the latter. Thanks to this power, the lender is able to extract income through a greater access to guarantees in loan contracts.
The variables Age and Size in equation (2) in table IV are consistent with this interpretation (although only Size is significant). The negative sign of both variables indicates that the larger and older SMEs reduce the probabilities of including personal guarantees as they become more known on the market. This is due to the fact that the informative asymmetry between the internal bank and the rest of entities is reduced, and with it, the power of monopolization of the former and its possibilities of extracting income.
Continuing with the variables of private information in table IV, the only ones that are significant are Banks and Trust. The first shows a negative sign in equation (2) and positive in (3). This reflects that the companies that only work with banks are less (more) likely to pledge personal guarantees (or real ones). The banks preference for real guarantees could be due to the difficulty involved in guarding their preservation and to perform the execution of personal property, so they prefer to request concrete assets. However, the variable Banks is not significant (by a narrow margin) in equation (2).
As for the variable Trust, the significant and positive sign obtained in the regression (3) in table IV indicates that the higher the trust between the firm and the lender, the more likely it is that the former is required real guarantees. This result may seem contradictory by itself, as it implies a punishment for the SMEs that have a closer relationship with the financial institution. However, it gains a different meaning if it is interpreted together with the negative sign of the same variable in estimate (1) in table IV. In this way, it implies that the intermediaries that trust their borrower more, grant cheaper loans, but in exchange, request more real guarantees. According to Bester (1985) and Besanko & Thakor (1987) , the companies with lower risk are the ones that prefer this type of conditions instead of those with greater chances of failing, which opt for loans with high risk premiums and reduced guarantees. Thus, the trust relationship seems to be used by the intermediary to determine the risk of the different clients. Nevertheless, the variable trust in equation (1) Likewise, the use of external resources increases the likelihood of supplying personal guarantees; however the relation is not significant.
An analysis of the results robustness
Once the determinants of the debt cost and the probability of it being guaranteed have been analysed, this section gives greater robustness to the previous results. To this end, alternative definitions for some variables have been set out, and the estimates have been repeated.
In the first place, logarithms have been calculated for the variables that were significant in the last section (except the binary and the scales ones), in order to verify the existence of a decreasing effect on the dependant variable. Specifically, it has been taken the natural logarithm of: Duration, one plus Concentration, Age and Leverage. The results of the estimates have been presented in the first three equations in table V.
When analysing the debt cost in the regression (1) in table V, the use of logarithms does not vary the signs of the coefficients and even increases slightly the significance of most of the estimates. Therefore, if with the lineal specification it was said that the debt cost rises as the firm borrows from fewer financial institutions, now, on taking logarithms, it can be affirmed that this effect is decreasing. This result indicates that the private information flows quickly between the borrower and the money lender.
Table V. Robustness analysis.
The estimates of the equations (1) and (4) have been carried out by OLS, while the logit regressions (2), (3),(5) and (6) have been calculated by maximum verisimilitude. In columns (1) and (3), the dependent variable is Risk Premium. On the other hand, the dependent variable in equations (2) and (4) is the fictitious Personal Guarantees, while in regressions (3) and (6) is the fictitious Real Guarantees. Duration is the natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has been working with the bank in equations (1), (2) and (3) and the ortogonalysed version of the variable Duration in the three remaining regressions. Age is the number of years since the firm was created in equations (4), (5) and (6) and its natural logarithm in the three remaining regressions. Leverage is the ratio of external resources to total assets in equations (4), (5) and (6) Likewise, it has been mentioned before that the public information transmitted reduces the informative asymmetry between the firm and the financial intermediaries, so the latter charge a lower risk premium. However, with the logarithmic specification of the variable Age, it can be stated that the greater part of this information (or at least the most important part) is revealed during the first years of the SME's existence. Therefore, the reduction in the interest rate is more pronounced in that period.
In addition to these results, in regression (1) In contrast, the variable Age becomes significant and with a negative sign in equation (2) in table V, which reflects a greater drop in the request for personal guarantees during the first years of existence of a firm. This may be own to the improvement in SME reputation during the first years of activity, as these correspond to the most difficult period, where the majority of companies fail.
Lastly, in equation (2) in table V, it can be observed that the variable Leverage loses signification with the use of logarithms, which allows us to reject the decreasing influence of this variable on the likelihood of guaranteeing the debt. As for risk premium and real guarantees (equations (1) and (3), respectively, in table V), these are still not affected by the degree of the firm's indebtedness.
In this section, in addition to the use of logarithms, the possible problem of multicolinearity that could be the cause for the high correlation found between the variables Age and Duration (.5897) and Concentration and Scope (-.6593) (see table III) is set out.
One possible solution would be to orthogonalise the variables. In order to do this, Duration is regressed over Age and Concentration over Scope and the remainders are obtained.
These represent the part of the dependent variable (Duration or Concentration) that is not explained by the independent one (Age and Scope). Consequently, in equations (4), (5), and (6) in table V, duration and concentration of the relationship have been approached through the corresponding remainders. The results obtained in this way do not significantly vary from those obtained in table IV, so that it can be stated that the problem of multicolinearity is not severe.
EXTENSIONS OF THE RESULTS
In this section a more detailed and precise analysis of the determinants of the risk premium and the guarantees imposed by financial institutions in lending to SMEs is carried out. To this end, first the sample is divided into two groups depending on the duration of the bank relationship. In this way, the influence on the results of the maturity of the relationship between the firm and the intermediary is tested. Secondly, the relationship between the cost of the loan and the guarantees is studied, in order to analyse how they are jointly used by the lenders to establish conditions in their loans. This allows for a better understanding of the indebtedness relationship.
Duration of the relationship between the financial institution and the firm
In this section the sample is divided into two groups depending on the duration of the relationship between the firm and the financial institution. To do so, the median of the number of years the firm has been working with the bank (15 years) has been used. The estimates of equations (1) and (4) have been made by OLS, while the logit regressions (2), (3), (5) and (6) have been calculated by maximum verisimilitude. In the first three columns of this table the estimates on the firms that have been working with their bank for fifteen years or less are set out, while that in equations (4), (5) and (6) the calculations are carried out on the firms with a relationship of over fifteen years. In columns (1) and (3) the dependent variable is Risk Premium. On the other hand, the dependant variable in equations (2) and (4) is the fictitious Personal Guarantees, while that in regressions (3) and (6) is the fictitious Real Guarantees. Both these and the rest of variables have been defined in The results obtained in both groups of firms are presented in table VI. It is observed that the effect of the variable Duration on the cost and the likelihood of pledging real guarantees depends on whether its initial maturity is lower (equations (1) and (3), respectively) or higher (equations (4) and (6), respectively) than its median. Thus, during the first fifteen years of relationship the financial intermediary takes advantage of the information he obtains from the firm to exert a monopoly and impose harder conditions (higher interest rates and real guarantees). During this period, the rest of lenders have observed the relationship and have been able to infer the real quality of the SME, so they are fit to compete for it. From this moment on, the monopoly power of the internal bank is reduced and it has to improve the terms of the debt as the relationship progresses in order to not lose its client (nevertheless, the variable Duration is only significant in equation 3).
Consistent with that expressed above is the significant and negative sign of the variables Age and Size in equation (1) This behaviour is own to the reduction of the information differential between the internal bank and the other intermediaries and of the market power of the former. Likewise, the negative sign of these variables also imply that the smaller and younger SMEs are forced to accept harder conditions than the rest. The reason for this lies in the lack of knowledge the market has about these firms, which makes it more difficult for them to find intermediaries that offer loans on better terms.
Finally, the variable Trust is significant in equations (1) and (3) in table VI, with negative and positive signs, respectively. These results confirms that financial institutions grant loans at a lower interest rates and requesting more real guarantees to firms they trust more.
Relationship between risk premium, personal guarantees and real guarantees
Lastly, in this section we analyse the way the conditions of the loans (cost and guarantees) relate to each other. To this end, certain suppositions about the behaviour of the financial institutions when granting loans are made.
When a borrower applies for a loan, the financial intermediary evaluates the success probability of the operation and assigns a risk premium that will allow the bank to obtain the required returns. In the absence of other considerations, the lender would offer that interest rate and the client would accept or refuse it. However, the possibility of supplying guarantees allows for a much wider range of debt contracts. Thus, the financial institution may offer loans with different combinations of interest rate and guarantees that suit the characteristics of the different borrowers.
Consequently, the risk premium the intermediary decides to impose on a firm is not unrelated to its capacity of pledging guarantees. In order to reflect this behaviour, in equation (1) There are two stances on the relationship between real guarantees (or personal ones) and the risk premium. On the one hand, a negative sign reflects the fact that the bank charges a lower interest rate to firms that signal their lower risk by supplying grater guarantees. According to Bester (1985) and Besanko & Thakor (1987) , this is due to the fact that these variables act as a classification mechanism. Therefore, if the lender offers a menu of debt contracts, the firms with a lower likelihood of failure prefer loans with lower interest rates and higher guarantees. On the other hand, a positive sign indicates that both variables move in the same direction. On raising the cost and the guarantees simultaneously, the financial institution avoids the risk enhancement of the borrowers that would occur if any of these terms reached extreme levels. In effect, according to Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) , firms that are not very likely to comply with their obligations are the ones that accept high interest rates, while richer clients, that are associated to a lower risk aversion, are the ones that can supply greater guarantees.
The establishment of real and personal guarantees are closely related, so that the request of either one depends on the availability of the other. On that account, in regressions (2) and (3) in table VII, it has been included the scales Real and Personal, respectively, as control elements.
The sense of the relationship between both types of guarantees depends on the use the financial institution makes of these elements. At first, the mission of both terms is to ease the ex-post opportunism of those firms that, sheltered in their informational opacity could be inclined to not comply with the indebtedness contract (Bodernhorn, 2002).
However, they both differ in their nature. Thus, real guarantees imposes restrictions on the use of the assets the firm supplies, while personal guarantees represent the general right on the guarantor's patrimony without establishing limitations in the use of these assets.
Therefore, if the bank applies these terms on a complementary basis, the sign of the relationship is positive, while if the personal guarantees are used to substitute the real ones (or vice versa), the sign of the relationship is negative. frequently also bear higher interest rates. In addition, the positive sign of the scales Real and Personal in estimates (2) and (3), respectively, confirm the complementary use financial intermediaries make of both types of guarantees when affronting the borrower's risk.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyses the effect of bank relationships on the interest rate and personal and real guarantees borne by a sample of small and medium-sized enterprises in their indebtedness. This matter, widely debated in international literature on financial intermediation, has not been sufficiently developed in Spain. Studies carried out up to the moment have mainly focused on large firms, using the share participation of the financial institution in the firm and/or whether the company belongs to a banking group as 7 Degryse & Cayseele (2000) come to the same conclusion operating in a similar manner. measurements of the relationship strength. In this sense, the present study uses the duration, concentration and scope of the bank relationships, as well as the trust the financial intermediary places on the management of the firm and the typology of the lenders, with the intention of analysing their incidence on the cost of bank financing and the guarantees requested.
The results of this paper indicate that SMEs that work with fewer financial intermediaries obtain debt at a lower cost. This reflects that the advantages linked to debt concentration are greater than the disadvantages. This tendency agrees with the greater part of the studies that use this measure of relationship strength (Petersen & Rajan, 1994 and Van Cayseele, 2000) , without any differences between the evidence found in Europe and United States being found.
However, differences in behaviour are appreciated between firms on both continents when the private information variable studied is the duration of the bank relationship. Thus, in United States the evidence confirms the beneficial effect of the relationship (Berger & Udell, 1995) , while in European firms with longer relationships bear higher interest rates (Angelini, Di Salvo & Ferri, 1998 and Van Caseele, 2000) . In this sense, the behaviour of the sample of SMEs used in this study is similar to the rest of the surrounding firms.
The fact that European firms that have longer relationships with their financial intermediaries obtain debt at a higher cost may be own to the pronounced informational monopoly they are subjected to, which surpasses the possible benefits of the strength of the relationship with the lender. The cause for this greater monopoly could arise from the fewer financing alternatives European SMEs have when compared to North American ones, as the former operate in countries with economies dominated by banks.
In addition, a clear tendency towards raising the use of personal guarantees as the relationship progresses and the degree of information increases is perceived in this study.
Lastly, firms that have a more intense relationship of trust with their lender obtain loans with a lower risk premium, but pledging more real guarantees.
On the whole, the evidence found on bank relationships is ambiguous when determining their effect on the indebtedness conditions in Spanish SMEs. Therefore, it cannot be asserted that the influence of the strength of the relationship is purely positive or negative. Additionally, the reduced value of R 2 indicates the existence of other factors that affect the interest rate and the guarantees. So, the sign and the significance of the private information variables used could be distorted due to the omission of those elements.
